In our overview of the work of Bezalel Peleg we distinguish three periods: the sixties, with a strong emphasis on cooperative game theory; the seventies, with an emphasis on economic models and the first works in social choice theory; and the eighties and onward, with seminal works in social choice, cooperative and noncooperative game theory.
Early work: the sixties
The first work of Bezalel Peleg concentrates on the stable set, the bargaining set, and the kernel for cooperative games. The stable set is the von Neumann and Morgenstern 2 stable set, at that time still plainly called the solution. The title of the first paper [1, 1959] of Bezalel Peleg is On the set of solvable n-person games: this means the set of (superadditive) n-person games with transferable utility (TU) that possess a solution. At that time (1959) the general existence of such a solution was still an open problem. 3 Bezalel Peleg shows that the subclass of all partial quota games has a solution and, moreover, that this subclass has the same dimension as the class of all games, and in particular that for a game picked at random the probability is positive that such a game is solvable. This paper draws on earlier work of Shapley (1953a) and Gillies (1953) .
In [2, 1960] (with R. Aumann) the stable set is extended to cooperative games without sidepayments. This paper also explicitly formulates the important notions of α-effectiveness (expressing what a coalition can attain by itself) and β-effectiveness (expressing what a coalition cannot be kept from), leading to α and β versions of solutions, in particular of the core. The main result of this paper is that three-person zero-sum nontransferable utility (NTU) games are solvable. Paper [4, 1963] contains extensions and the proofs.
The early work of Bezalel Peleg also includes a first paper [3, 1963] (see also [18, 1967] ) with an existence result on the bargaining set M (i) 1 , proving a conjecture of Davis and Maschler (1963) . Other work in this period concerns quota games [5, 1963; 7, 1964; 8, 1965] , bargaining sets for games without sidepayments [6, 1963] and for quota games [7, 1964] , and the kernel [8, 12, 13, 1965; 14, 15, 16, 1966; 20, 1967] , which is a subset of the bargaining set M (i) 1 for games with transferable utility. In [15, 1966] (with M. Maschler) an algebraic proof is provided of the existence of the kernel and, thus, of the bargaining set M (i) 1 -earlier existence results were based on a fixed point argument. This method of proof-inspired by the computation of the kernel for quota games in [12, 1965] -uses the notion of separating collections of coalitions, studied further in [22, 1968] and also establishes that the intersection of the kernel and the core is nonempty if the core is nonempty.
The concept of balanced collections of coalitions is crucial for studying the core of games with and without transferable utility (sidepayments). 4 In [11, 1965] Bezalel Peleg provides an inductive method to construct minimal balanced collections, that is, given the minimal balanced collections for a set of n elements the method provides those for a set of n + 1 elements.
Bezalel Peleg's early work also includes joint work with A. Paz in the area of information science [9, 1965; 21, 1968] and work in the area of utility theory related to game theory [10, 1965] . In [17, 1966] he outlines an approach to cooperative and noncooperative game theory without utility functions, based on preference relations only. He provides an existence result for equilibrium points (see also [19, 1967] ) and proposes a dominance relation for cooperative games on which the core, the stable set, and bargaining sets can be based. In [25, 1969] an equilibrium existence result is proved for games with infinitely many players but finite pure strategy sets; the sufficient condition for existence used here is, roughly, that the set of payoff functions that only depend on finitely many players is dense in the set of all payoff functions. Finally, we mention [23, 1968] on centralized games and [24, 1968] on constant-sum majority games. A centralized game consists of a finite number of TU-games together with a collection of parties to which the players in the separate TU-games belong; in [23] the Shapley value 5 of such a game is studied.
Work in the seventies
Bezalel Peleg's work in the seventies extends his work in game theory from the sixties but also broadens to general equilibrium theory.
His publications in this period with emphasis on game theory are [33, 1972] and [45, 1976] . In [33] (with M. Maschler and L. Shapley) it is shown that for convex games the bargaining set M (i) 1 and the kernel (for the grand coalition) coincide with the core and the nucleolus, respectively. In [45] (with M. Maschler) a relation is established between stable sets of certain dynamic systems and generalized nucleoli.
In [26, 1970] Bezalel Peleg provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a utility function representing an irreflexive, transitive partial ordering on a topological space. The main condition is the existence of a countable subset 'separating' the ordering. 6 Most of the remaining work in this period is on general equilibrium models. Paper [27, 1970] (joint with M. Yaari) proves existence of competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with countably many commodities. It is first proved that the core is nonempty and next the replication argument of Debreu and Scarf (1963) is used to establish existence of a competitive equilibrium. A reoccurring concept is that of efficiency prices in an economy: broadly, prices at which consumption bundles and/or production plans are Pareto optimal. In [30, 1970] , again joint with M. Yaari, efficiency prices are studied in infinite dimensional space. The motivation provided for the work in both [27] and [30] is growth theory or, more generally, infinite horizon models. The concept of efficiency prices is further studied in a series of papers on efficiency prices for optimal consumption plans [28, 29, 1970; 31, 1971; 34, 1972; 36, 1973] . Competitive prices for optimal consumption plans are considered in [39, 1974] and [46, 1977] , and optimal consumption plans in multisector economies in [32, 1972; 38, 1973; 40, 1974] , and later in [77, 1992] .
Paper [37, 1973] (with M. Yaari) considers optimal consumption plans of an agent with preferences changing over time. 7 This is viewed as a noncooperative game in which changed preferences are modelled by considering different players. An equilibrium consumption plan is a Nash equilibrium in this game. As a byproduct the paper provides a Nash equilibrium existence result for countably many players.
In [42, 1975] (with D. Levhari and J. Paroush) the familiar characterization of first order stochastic dominance in terms of expected utility is extended to multivariate distributions. In [43, 1975] (with M. Yaari) stochastic dominance among discrete random variables for risk averse decision makers is characterized in terms of efficiency prices. This work is extended to more general (nondiscrete) random variables in [44, 1975] .
The main result of [35, 1972] is that set of efficient (Pareto optimal) points of a compact and convex subset of Euclidean space is contractible. The proof uses the Arrow-Barankin-Blackwell Theorem, 8 which says that the set of regular efficient points (efficient points at which there is a supporting hyperplane with strictly positive normal) is dense in the set of all efficient points. This theorem is generalized to infinite dimensional spaces by Bezalel Peleg [28, 29, 1970] , among others. In [47, 1978] the topological structure of the efficient point set under uncertainty as in [43] and [44] mentioned above is investigated.
Note [41, 1974] (with R. Aumann) provides an early example of endowment manipulation in a two person, two goods exchange economy.
Work in the eighties and onwards
We discuss the work of Bezalel Peleg since the end of the seventies under a number of headings.
Strategic social choice
A large part of the work of Bezalel Peleg starting at the end of the seventies and still continuing now is on social choice or, more precisely, in the overlapping area between social choice and game theory.
A first publication is [48, 1978] on so-called consistent voting systems. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 9 says that (in the classical social choice model with finitely many voters and alternatives) every nondictatorial social choice function with range at least three is manipulable. An 'exactly and strongly consistent' social choice function, as suggested in [48] , is a social choice function with the property that for every preference profile there is a strong Nash equilibrium in the associated direct revelation game leading to the sincere outcome. This concept has been further explored in subsequent work of several authors, including Bezalel Peleg and coauthors: see Chaps. 4 and 5 of [B1, 1984] , Part II of [B3, 2010], and [122, 2006] (with H. Peters), extending the concept and results to models with a continuum of voters. In [126, 2010] (with A. Procaccia) another way to escape the negative consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is proposed, namely through the concept of mediated equilibrium or equilibrium with threats (see also Chap. 8 in [B3]).
Another central concept in the work of Bezalel Peleg is that of an effectivity function. An effectivity function is a mapping from coalitions of players to collections of sets of alternatives, describing what coalitions can obtain by cooperating. Effectivity functions can arise in many ways: from social choice functions or correspondences, from simple (cooperative) games, from strategic (noncooperative) games and in particular from game forms. An effectivity function can also be considered as a primitive concept. In [57, 1982] (joint with H. Moulin) the question is answered under which conditions an effectivity function can be represented by a game form such that for each profile of preferences the resulting game has a strong Nash equilibrium-see also Chap. 6 in [B1, 1984] . The connection between simple games (committees) and social choice functions and correspondences is explored in several publications, notably [49, 1978; 52, 1979; 54, 1980; 55, 1981] and [58, 1983] . See also [56, 1981] and [61, 1984] .
In [96, 1998 ] effectivity functions are used to model constitutions, thus establishing a connection with the theory of rights. 10 A game form is developed that represents a given effectivity function. Such a game form is Nash consistent if it has a Nash equilibrium for every profile of preferences (further developed in [111, 2002] with H. Peters and T. Storcken); it is acceptable 11 if Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal (see also [116, 2004] ); it is strong or strongly Nash consistent if it has a strong Nash equilibrium for every preference profile (see [57] discussed above). Constitutional implementation refers to implementation (of social choice functions or correspondences) while preserving power, that is, not changing the effectivity function: see [114, 2002] (with E. Winter) and [119, 2005] (with H. Peters and T. Storcken). Further work in this area includes representation in coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see also below) in [110, 2002] , continuity of representations in [120, 2006] , and binary effectivity rules in [121, 2006] (all with H. Keiding), and Nash consistent representation through lottery models in [125, 2009] (with H. Peters). Related papers are [108, 2001] (with H. Keiding) and [112, 2002] . In Part I of [B3] much of this literature is reviewed and partially extended. Publication [68, 1988 ] (with C. d'Aspremont) deals with representations of committees (simple games) in the context of incomplete information.
Works on voting and specifically on manipulability in social choice include [51, 1979; 71, 1990; 73, 1991] , and [78, 1992] . In [51] the notion of asymptotic nonmanipulability of voting systems is defined, and studied in particular for positionalist voting systems, i.e., voting systems which can be based on scoring methods. In [71] (with S. Barberà) the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (footnote 13) is extended to a more general domain of continuous preferences; the proof is based on the useful notion of an option set. Probabilistic social choice rules under an Arrovian condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, resulting in random dictatorship, are the subject of [65, 1986] (with P. Pattanaik). An extension of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to dependent juries is offered in [128, 2012] (joint with S. Zamir).
Papers [90, 1996] and [91, 1996] are concerned with double implementation of Walras and of Lindahl equilibrium. The adjective 'double' refers to the fact that (e.g.) not only the Walrasian equilibria of the economy coincide with the Nash equilibria of the game form or mechanism but also these Nash equilibria are strong, that is, resistent against coalitional deviations.
Noncooperative game theory
In [66, 1987] (with B. Bernheim and M. Winston) the new equilibrium concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium was introduced. This concept is stronger than Nash equilibrium since it also takes coalitional deviations into account, but weaker than strong Nash equilibrium, since it only takes specific credible deviations into account. An additional advantage is that its existence is less often a problem than is the case for strong Nash equilibrium. Further works on coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and its applications are [76, 1992; 83, 1995; 98, 1998 ], and [110, 2002] . In [101, 1999] (with P. Sudhölter) it is shown that in a model with single-peaked preferences generalized median voter schemes 12 induce game forms in which truthful voting is a coalitionproof Nash equilibrium.
Starting with [85, 1996] (with S. Tijs) there is a stream of results about axiomatic characterizations of Nash equilibria in games and of the Walrasian correspondence in economies based on a consistency principle. This consistency principle states, basically, that if we fix the strategies of some players or the allocations of some agents then the strategies of the remaining players or the allocations of the remaining agents in the thus reduced game or economy do not change. For games, this avenue of research is further explored in [86, 1996] (with J. Potters and S. Tijs), [88, 1996] (with R. Heumen, S. Tijs and P. Borm), and [93, 1997] (with P. Sudhölter). For economies the relevant papers are [87, 1996] (with A. van den Nouweland and S. Tijs) and [94, 1997] (with A. Majumdar).
Cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory keeps on playing an important role in the work of Bezalel Peleg since the eighties. In [50, 1979] (with M. Maschler and L. Shapley) geometric properties of the kernel, the nucleolus and related solution concepts are investigated. Axiomatic treatments of the core and related concepts, in which the Davis-Maschler reduced game property 13 is central, are the subject of [62, 1985; 64, 1986; 70, 1993; 72, 1990; 81, 1992] , and [113, 2002] (with P. Sudhölter). In [63, 1986] it is shown that the core of an ordinal convex game without sidepayments is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Cores of compound simple games are studied in [67, 1987] . The least-core, nucleolus and kernel of homogeneous weighted majority games are the subject of [80, 1992] (with J. Rosenmüller). See also [82, 1994] (with P. Sudhölter and J. Rosenmüller) on the kernel of homogeneous games. On the nucleolus and the prekernel see [97, 1998 ] and [105, 2000] (both with P. Sudhölter). On bargaining sets see [115, 2002; 117, 2005 ] (with P. Sudhölter), and [123, 2007] (with R. Holzman and P. Sudhölter).
In [74, 1991] (with E. Einy) linear measures of inequality for cooperative games are considered, and in [107, 2001] (with J. L. Hougaard and L. Thorlund-Petersen) Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a cooperative game. The Dutta-Ray 12 Moulin (1980) . 13 Davis and Maschler (1965) . solution 14 for convex games is generalized in [118, 2005] (with J.L. Hougaard and L. P. Østerdal).
Further works on cooperative games include [69, 1988] (with M. Maschler and G. Owen) on paths leading to the Nash set, i.e., the set of Nash bargaining outcomes in a nonconvex cooperative bargaining game; [99, 1998 ] (with P. Borm, G.-J. Otten and S. Tijs) on the minimal compromise value for games without sidepayments; [124, 2008] (with B. O'Neill) on lexicographic composition of simple games; and [127, 2012] (with P. Sudhölter and J. Zarzuelo) on two-person NTU-games.
Last but not least, the book 'Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games' [B2, 2003, 2007] (with P. Sudhölter) has become a classical work on cooperative game theory.
Other topics
The extension of an ordering over a set of alternatives to the power set, i.e., to subsets of alternatives, has received attention in two works, namely [59, 1984] (with Y. Kannai) and [60, 1984] (with P. Pattanaik).
Contributions to biology from a game-theoretic point of view and in particular to theories about the behavior of bees are [75, 1992] (with A. Shmida), [79, 1992] (with A. Shmida and S. Ellner), [84, 1995] (with F. Thuijsman, M. Amitai, and A. Shmida), and [92, 1997] .
In [102, 2000] (with W. Güth and H. Kliemt) and [109, 2001] (with W. Güth) evolutionary analysis is applied to human behavior in games of trust and in games in which payoffs depend not only on chosen strategies but also on genetically determined stimuli.
Remaining works on diverse topics include the following. In [89, 1996] (with W. Güth) ring formation in auctions is considered. The canonical extensive form of a game form is studied in [100, 1999] and [103, 2000] (with J. Rosenmüller and P. Sudhölter). In [95, 1997] a critical consideration of the 'Nash program' (which seeks to 'back up' cooperative or axiomatic solution concepts by noncooperative games, not to be confused with various types of implementation) is presented. Correlated equilibria in games with many players are studied in [104, 2000] (with H. Keiding).
Epilogue
The richness, breadth and depth of Bezalel Peleg's work should be apparent from the above overview and from the list of publications below. Additional words of support seem redundant. We also refrain from identifying 'research highlights': any reader may judge for himself. As co-authors and friends of Bezalel, we would like to express that it has been and is an honor and pleasure to work with him, not just because of his intellectual qualities but also because of his openness and friendliness. Thank you very much! 
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